Key-dependent message (KDM) security was introduced by Black, Rogaway and Shrimpton to address the case where key cycles occur among encryptions, e.g., a key is encrypted with itself. It was mainly motivated by key cycles in Dolev-Yao models, i.e., symbolic abstractions of cryptography by term algebras, and a corresponding computational soundness result was later shown by Adão et al. However, both the KDM definition and this soundness result do not allow the general active attacks typical for Dolev-Yao models or for security protocols in general.
Introduction
Encryption schemes are the oldest and arguably the most important cryptographic schemes. Their security has been rigorously studied very early, starting with Shannon's work for the information-theoretic case [52] . Computational definitions for public-key encryption were developed over time, in particular in [42, 54, 51, 37] . The strongest of these definitions is security against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks, abbreviated IND-CCA2 [29] ; it is nowadays strongly believed to cover what one expects from secure encryption on its own. For symmetric encryption, the first real definitions were, to the best of our knowledge, given in [37, 45, 28] , using the same basic ideas.
However, for use within larger protocols, additional requirements on encryption schemes are still emerging. One specific additional requirement is the ability to securely encrypt key-dependent messages. The first concrete use case occurred in [32] , where encryption of different private keys with one another was used to implement an all-or-nothing property in a credential system to discourage people from transferring individual credentials. Another area that brought up this requirement is the use of formal methods or symbolic cryptography. Here the question is whether simple abstractions of cryptographic primitives exist that can be used by automated proof tools (model checkers or theorem provers) to prove or disprove a wide range of security protocols that use cryptography in a blackbox manner. The bestknown abstractions are term algebras constructed from certain base types and cryptographic operators such as E and D for en-and decryption, called Dolev-Yao models after the first such abstraction [38] . As soon as one has a multi-user variant of such a model, the keys are explicit base terms. Hence from the term algebra side it is natural that keys can also be encrypted (i.e., used as leaves in arbitrary terms). Thus most Dolev-Yao models simply assume that key cycles are allowed. Once the cryptographic justification of such models was started in [2] , it was recognized that key cycles had to be excluded from the original models to get cryptographic results. The same holds for later results [1, 43, 22, 20, 44, 21, 25, 48, 15, 36, 35] .
Motivated primarily by symbolic cryptography, a definition of key-dependent message security (KDM security) was introduced in [31] . It generalizes the definition from [32] by allowing arbitrary functions of the keys (and not just individual keys) as plaintexts, and by considering symmetric encryption schemes. Furthermore, [31] gives a construction of a KDM-secure scheme in the random oracle model. Using the KDM definition, [3] extended the results about the computational soundness of Dolev-Yao models in a passive setting to include key cycles. Still, Dolev-Yao models are only of limited interest in a passive setting because their main usage is in protocol proofs, where active attackers are a standard threat.
In this work, we extend the definition of KDM security to active attacks and, as this also is needed for the desired soundness proof of Dolev-Yao models with key cycles, to a limited dynamic revelation of keys. We speak of AKDM security and DKDM security for adaptive KDM security and dynamic KDM security, respectively. While dynamic revelations of keys in cryptography mostly occur as a consequence of adversary models with dynamic corruption of participants, we will see that in the class of protocols typically treated with Dolev-Yao models, they can occur even under static corruptions, which are the standard adversary model in Dolev-Yao models. After the definitions (Section 2), we present the following results:
• In Section 3, we construct symmetric encryption schemes secure under the new definitions. For AKDM security we achieve this by a generic construction from KDM-secure schemes and MACs (message authentication codes). For DKDM security we present a direct construction in the random oracle model.
• In Section 4, we show that DKDM security is sufficient for the soundness of symbolic symmetric encryption in the strong sense of blackbox reactive simulatability (BRSIM)/UC [49, 50, 34, 24, 23, 26] . This notion entails strong compositionality guarantees and the retention of a variety of security properties.
• In Section 5, we explore the relationships between the definition variants, also in combination with standard definitions of symmetric encryption. For instance, we consider whether KDM-secure schemes that are also IND-CCA2-secure are automatically AKDM-secure. (No, they are not.) The relationship of AKDM and DKDM is particularly important since we can achieve AKDM security by a generic construction based on KDM security, while we need DKDM security in the soundness proof. We show that both definitions coincide provided that either only a logarithmically bounded number of keys are used, or only a constant number is revealed. The question whether both definitions coincide for arbitrary leakages of keys remains open in this paper and seems similar to the selective decommitment problem [39] , but not directly related to the cases with known answers.
• Our definitions include a variant that we call polynomial-oracle; we also define such a variant for KDM security and consider it when exploring the relation between the definitions. We believe this will be needed to successfully construct KDM-secure schemes in the standard model of cryptography in the future.
• We show that for stateful encryption schemes, semantic security does not imply KDM security even if only key cycles of an arbitrary minimum size i are allowed (within Section 5). In [31] all separating results require key cycles of length 1.
Clearly, the constructions that we present in Section 3 are for cases where no simpler equivalence with prior definitions exists in Section 5.
Adaptive and Dynamic Security Definitions with Key Cycles
This section contains our new definitions of AKDM and DKDM security. While the first definition constitutes a natural extension of KDM security to active attacks, the second one additionally allows limited dynamic revelation of keys. This is needed for the desired soundness proof of Dolev-Yao models with key cycles. We start by summarizing basic notation needed for defining and extending the notion of KDM security as introduced in [31] . 1 We write ":=" for deterministic and "←" for probabilistic assignment, and " R ←" for uniform random choice from a set. An error element ↓ is available as an addition to the domains and ranges of all functions and algorithms. By x := ++y for integer variables x, y we mean y := y + 1; x := y. The length of a string m is denoted by |m|, a string of l zero-bits is written 0 l , and string concatenation ||.
Like many current cryptographic definitions, the AKDM and DKDM definitions are written in terms of oracles performing actions of an honest participant and adversaries. Oracles and adversaries can be considered interactive probabilistic Turing machines (except that the original KDM definition corresponds to an interactive infinite-state system) where oracles have one communication tape pair, and adversaries have one communication tape pair (or several if they use several oracles) and an additional output tape. The final content of this output tape is considered the result of a joint computation and can be used in expressions, e.g., equations of the form "A O = x". That an oracle offers a query type q means that it accepts inputs of the form q and returns one output for each such input.
We always write k for a security parameter, which is a natural number. It is an input of all the following machines, adversaries as well as oracles, but omitted in the notation for readability. For instance, we write A O and not A(k) O(k) to denote an adversary A using an oracle O. Thus the resulting expressions are functions of k, and terms like "negligible" are meaningful for them. In particular, a function g : N → R ≥0 is called negligible iff for all positive polynomials Q, there exists k 0 such that
Like some underlying papers we use the word "advantage" loosely for measures of adversary success (with precise definitions of those measures, of course).
Definition 2.1 (Symmetric Encryption)
A symmetric encryption scheme is a tuple SE = (gen SE , E, D) of polynomial-time algorithms. Key generation with a security parameter k ∈ N is written sk ← gen SE (0 k ). The (probabilistic) encryption of a message m ∈ {0, 1} + is denoted by c ← E(sk , m), and decryption by m := D(sk , c). The result may be ↓; then the ciphertext is called invalid for this key. Decryption of a correctly generated ciphertext for a correctly generated key must always yield the original plaintext.
We assume without loss of generality that keys for a fixed security parameter k are of a fixed length. ✸ We repeat two typical definitions of encryption security. Definition 2.2 (Indistinguishability under Chosen-ciphertext Attacks) Given a symmetric encryption scheme SE = (gen SE , E, D), the IND-CCA2 oracle SymCCA2 is defined as follows:
2 It has a variable sk initialized as sk
, an initially empty set C and the following query types:
• On input (enc, m): Let m 0 := m and m 1 := 0 |m| , set c ← E(sk , m b ) and C := C ∪ {c}, and output c.
• On input (dec, c): If c ∈ C , return D(sk , c), else ↓.
The IND-CCA2 advantage of an adversary A that interacts with SymCCA2 and finally outputs a bit b * is defined as Adv CCA2 (A) :
We say that SE is indistinguishable under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack or IND-CCA2-secure iff the IND-CCA2 advantage of every polynomial-time adversary is negligible. (Recall that the expression is a function of the security parameter k by our conventions.) ✸
We call SymCCA2 with b = 0 the real IND-CCA2 oracle and with b = 1 the fake IND-CCA2 oracle, and similarly for the following oracles that have a bit b.
Definition 2.3 (Integrity of Ciphertexts) Given a symmetric encryption scheme SE = (gen SE , E, D), the ciphertext-integrity oracle or INT-CTXT oracle SymInt is defined as follows: It has a variable sk initialized as sk ← gen SE (0 k ), an initially empty set C , and the following query types:
• On input (enc, m): Set c ← E(sk , m) and C := C ∪ {c}, and output c.
• On input (dec, c):
The INT-CTXT advantage Adv INT (A) of an adversary A that interacts with SymInt is defined as the probability that SymInt outputs m = ↓ on any input (dec, c) with c ∈ C . The encryption scheme is said to provide integrity of ciphertexts or to be INT-CTXT-secure iff the INT-CTXT advantage of every probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A is negligible. ✸
The notion of key-dependent message (KDM) security introduced in [31] as well as our extensions of it use encryption oracles that explicitly deal with messages that depend on keys. Instead of a fixed plaintext m, they accept a function g of the secret keys in encryption queries. For this, the oracle immediately handles several keys, here actually virtually infinitely many. Formally, encryption oracles offer query types (enc, j, g) meaning that the j-th key should be used to encrypt the result of evaluating the function g on the secret keys. In [31] the input g is required to be a RAM program for some fixed RAM machine model, and to represent a function f g that maps an infinite sequence sk of secret keys to a bitstring, i.e., f g : ({0, 1} * ) ∞ → {0, 1} + . We assume that the RAM model means that the key numbers used are explicitly visible in the program g. Additionally, every f g must be a function with fixed-length outputs for a given, fixed security parameter.
3 Let F ∞ denote all these permitted programs, and let A ∞ denote the class of polynomial-time adversaries using only permitted programs g ∈ F ∞ in encryption queries. The notation in [31] does not distinguish f g and g, and thus we also always write g in the following. We write π i to denote the program that computes the projection to the i-th key. Finally, we define "i ∈ g" for a program g ∈ F ∞ and a key number i ∈ N to mean that the i-th key is addressed by the program g.
In addition to these encryption queries, the new definition of adaptive KDM (AKDM) security allows decryption queries. (This is similar to definitions IND-CCA2 and the integrity of ciphertexts.) Here, decryption queries are of the form (dec, j, c); this means that the ciphertext c should be decrypted with the j-th key. We define AKDM security immediately in a polynomial-oracle version besides an unrestricted version closer to the original KDM definition. The problem with the unrestricted version, if one thinks of potential realizations in the standard model of cryptography, is that the adversary can force the oracle to perform non-polynomial-time computations. We exclude this by the polynomialoracle version. The following p-oracle-bounded adversaries have the appropriate behavior for a particular polynomial p. We immediately include reveal queries so that we can use the same adversary classes for DKDM. (An adversary trying to reveal queries on the oracle in the AKDM definition will just get an error result.) Definition 2.4 (p-oracle-bounded Adversaries) For every polynomial p, we define the class A p of p-oracle-bounded adversaries as the set of adversaries A ∈ A ∞ with the following additional property: For every security parameter k and every query (enc, j, g) or (dec, j, c) that A makes, we have j ≤ p(k) and i ≤ p(k) for all i ∈ g, and the Turing complexity of g is at most p(k). If A also makes queries (reveal, j), then also j ≤ p(k). (Queries of the form (reveal, j) will be used in dynamic security notions below.) ✸ Definition 2.5 (AKDM Security) Given a symmetric encryption scheme SE = (gen SE , E, D) the adaptive key-dependent message oracle or AKDM oracle SymAKDM is defined as follows: It has a (virtual) infinite key sequence sk = (sk i ) i∈N where each key, when first used, is initialized as sk i ← gen SE (0 k ), an initially empty set C of ciphertexts made, a bit b initialized as b R ← {0, 1}, and the following query types:
• On input (enc, j, g): Let m 0 := g( sk) and m 1 := 0 |m0| , encrypt c ← E(sk j , m b ), store c as C := C ∪ {(j, c)}, and output c.
• On input (dec, j, c) with j ∈ N and c ∈ {0,
The AKDM advantage of an adversary A that interacts with SymAKDM and finally outputs a bit b * is defined as Adv
We say that SE is (unrestricted) AKDM-secure or p-oracle-bounded AKDM-secure iff the AKDM advantage is negligible for every adversary A ∈ A ∞ or A ∈ A p , respectively, and that it is polynomial-oracle AKDM-secure iff it is p-oracle-bounded AKDM-secure for every polynomial p. ✸
We call SymAKDM with b = 0 the real AKDM oracle and with b = 1 the fake AKDM oracle, and similarly for the following oracles that have a bit b. Extending Definition 2.5 such that proofs can be conducted in the random oracle model can be achieved as usual by allowing both the AKDM oracle and the adversary to query the same random function, called a random oracle. (More algorithmically, the random oracle may choose a random answer when it first gets a query, and otherwise retrieve the prior answer for the same query.) Our second variant of KDM security is even stronger: keys may dynamically be revealed to the adversary. Dynamic key revelations have been considered in cryptography before (although not for KDM security, of course), in particular where the adversary may dynamically corrupt participants. However, typical Dolev-Yao models do not consider dynamic corruptions and one might therefore expect the desired soundness to hold already for AKDM-secure cryptographic realizations. But even scenarios with static corruptions may lead to dynamic key revelations on the layer of the KDM security: For instance, one can model protocols like group membership services where new participants may be included into a group at any time. Thus an established group key is shared with a new participant who may be an adversary. If one considers this situation for a protocol with key cycles, one immediately sees the need for dynamic KDM security. Hence our DKDM definition adds key revelations to the AKDM oracle. However, in these revelations we must exclude the commitment problem that is otherwise inherent in symmetric encryption, i.e., the problem that if a message m was encrypted with a key sk , and later sk becomes known, this allows the adversary to distinguish the real and fake oracle. For this, the oracle maintains two sets Rev and Enc that denote the keys that were already revealed and those that were already used for en-or decryption, respectively. Keys that are only part of the plaintext in an encryption are not added to Enc. Keys from Enc are not revealed. While this may seem a rather weak form of dynamic revelation, it already turns out to be sufficient for the desired soundness result, cf. Section 4. When deployed in protocols facing strong adversaries, e.g., adaptive corruption of parties, the definition might be further strengthened, e.g., by reflecting that revealing used keys does not leak any information about encryptions computed with unrevealed keys. Definition 2.6 (DKDM Security) Given a symmetric encryption scheme SE = (gen SE , E, D), the dynamic key-dependent message oracle or DKDM oracle SymDKDM is defined like the AKDM oracle SymAKDM with the following changes:
• It maintains two sets Rev and Enc, which are initially empty.
• On input (reveal, j): If j ∈ Enc, it sets Rev := Rev ∪ {j} and outputs sk j , else it outputs ↓.
• On input (enc, j, g) or (dec, j, c): If j ∈ Rev, it outputs ↓, else it acts as before and additionally sets Enc := Enc ∪ {j}.
The DKDM advantage of an adversary A that interacts with SymDKDM and finally outputs a bit b * is defined as Adv DKDM (A) :
We say that SE is (unrestricted) DKDM-secure or p-oracle-bounded DKDM-secure iff the DKDM advantage is negligible for every adversary A ∈ A ∞ or A ∈ A p , respectively, and that it is polynomial-oracle DKDM-secure iff it is p-oracle-bounded AKDM-secure for every polynomial p. ✸ By construction, we always have Rev ∩ Enc = ∅.
3 Constructions of AKDM-secure and DKDM-secure Schemes
In this section we give explicit constructions of AKDM-secure and DKDM-secure schemes. For AKDMsecure schemes, we can present a generic construction based on KDM-secure schemes and strongly unforgeable message authentication codes (MACs); for DKDM-secure schemes, we present an explicit construction in the random-oracle model.
AKDM-secure Schemes from KDM-secure Schemes and MACs
We show that the generic encrypt-then-MAC construction formalized in [30] yields an AKDM-secure encryption scheme when applied to a KDM-secure encryption scheme and a strongly unforgeable MAC scheme. We first repeat the underlying definitions.
Definition 3.1 (MAC Scheme) A MAC scheme, also called symmetric authentication scheme, is a tuple MAC = (gen MAC , MAC, Test) of polynomial-time algorithms. Key generation with a security parameter k ∈ N is written sk ← gen MAC (0 k ). The (potentially probabilistic) authentication of a message m ∈ {0, 1} + is denoted by t ← MAC(sk , m) (where "t" stands for "tag"), and testing by b := Test(sk , m, t) with an output b ∈ {true, false}. The tag is called valid (for the given message and key) iff b = true. Testing a correctly generated MAC for a correctly generated key must always yield true. ✸ Definition 3.2 (Strong Unforgeability of MACs) Given a MAC scheme MAC = (gen MAC , MAC, Test), the strong unforgeability oracle or SU oracle MAC SU is defined as follows: It has a variable sk initialized as sk ← gen MAC (0 k ), an initially empty set T , and the following query types:
• On input (auth, m): Set t ← MAC(sk , m); T := T ∪ {(m, t)}, and output t.
• On input (test, m, t): Return Test(sk , m, t).
The SU advantage Adv SU (A) of an adversary A that interacts with MAC SU is defined as the probability that MAC SU returns true for an input (test, m, t) with (m, t) ∈ T . The MAC scheme is called strongly unforgeable iff the SU advantage of every probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A is negligible. ✸ Definition 3.3 (Encrypt-then-MAC Construction) Let an encryption scheme SE = (gen SE , E, D) and a MAC scheme MAC = (gen MAC , MAC, Test) be given. Then the encrypt-then-MAC encryption scheme Encrypt then MAC(SE, MAC) is defined as follows:
• Keys are pairs (sk e , sk f ), generated as sk
• The encryption c of a message m with key (sk
• To decrypt a ciphertext c with key (sk e , sk f ), decompose c into (c ′ , t). If this fails or
In the security proof of this construction, we need multiple MAC keys. A standard hybrid argument shows that strong unforgeability of MACs extends to multiple keys. Hence in the respective proofs we immediately assume a multi-key SU oracle MAC SU mult that also accepts queries (generate) upon which it internally generates an additional key and whose other queries are extended with key numbers similar to the AKDM oracle, i.e., they become (auth, j, m) and (test, j, m, t).
Theorem 3.1 (AKDM Security of Encrypt-then-MAC) Let SE be a polynomial-oracle or unrestricted KDM-secure symmetric encryption scheme and let MAC be a strongly unforgeable MAC. Then Encrypt then MAC(SE, MAC) is a polynomial-oracle or unrestricted AKDM-secure encryption scheme, respectively. ✷ Proof. Assume that an adversary A ∈ A p has a not negligible AKDM advantage against SE * := Encrypt then MAC(SE, MAC), where p is a polynomial or ∞. We construct two adversaries A SE,1,p and A SE,2,p against the KDM security of SE and an adversary A MAC,p against the strong unforgeability of MAC, all using A as a blackbox, and we prove that at least one of them succeeds in its attack with not negligible probability.
The adversary A SE,1,p for a polynomial p is defined as follows. It generates p(k) MAC keys, which we call sk f i for i = 1, . . . , p(k) and maintains an initially empty set C of ciphertexts.
• Whenever A makes an encryption query (enc, j, g), then A SE,1,p for every i ∈ g inserts the MAC key sk • Whenever A makes a decryption query (dec, j, c),
′ , t) = false, it outputs ↓ to A. Otherwise it aborts the simulation; let E denote the event that this happens.
• When A outputs a bit b * (meant to distinguish the real and fake oracle),
The definition of A SE,1,∞ is the same except for the generation and retrieval of the appropriate MAC keys, because A may now use super-polynomial key indices j or i ∈ g. However, still only a polynomial number of keys is used overall, and hence we can use lazy generation. For this, A SE,1,∞ maintains an initially empty setŝk of pairs (i, sk The adversary A SE,2,p for every p is defined like A SE,1,p except that it outputs b ′ := 1 if the event E occurs, and b ′ := 0 otherwise. Clearly the new adversaries A SE ,1,p and A SE,2,p for a polynomial p belong to the class of permitted adversaries A p ′ for some polynomial p ′ . (Typically p ′ = p because the only change is the substitution of constants for variables in the programs g, which should not increase the runtime, but the programming model is not so precisely fixed that this can be stated.)
The adversary A MAC,p for a polynomial p is defined as follows. It initially generates p(k) encryption keys sk e i and lets the multi-key MAC oracle generate p(k) MAC keys internally. It maintains an initially empty set C of ciphertexts of the encrypt-then-MAC scheme.
• Whenever A makes an encryption query (enc, j, g), then A MAC,p computes c ′ ← E(sk e j , 0 |g(·)| ), i.e., it always encrypts messages like the fake KDM oracle. It then inputs (auth, j, c ′ ) to the multi-key SU oracle yielding a tag t, sets c := (c ′ , t) and C := C ∪ {(j, c)}, and outputs c to A.
• Whenever A makes a decryption query (dec, j, c), then A MAC,p decomposes c into (c ′ , t). If this fails or (j, c) ∈ C , it outputs ↓ to A. Otherwise it asks the multi-key SU oracle the query (test, j, c ′ , t). If the result is false, A MAC,p outputs ↓ to A, otherwise it stops the simulation (since t has proved to be a MAC forgery). With respect to the behavior of A, this is exactly the event E again.
For the unrestricted case, A MAC,∞ is again defined like A MAC,p for polynomials p except that it uses lazy generation of the encryption keys it really needs.
As long as the event E does not occur, both A SE,1,p and A SE,2,p together with the KDM oracle with a bit b perfectly simulate the AKDM oracle with the same bit b for every p.
Furthermore, A MAC,p together with the multi-key SU oracle perfectly simulates the fake AKDM oracle, i.e., SymAKDM with b = 1, until it stops. Let real and fake denote the events b = 0 and b = 1, respectively. By construction, the probability that A MAC,p breaks the strong unforgeability of the MAC is Adv SU (A MAC,p ) := Pr[E | fake]. We distinguish three cases: 
For A SE,1,p and if ¬E holds, i.e., in the second and fourth term of the sum, we have b ′ = b * by construction. As Pr[E] is negligible, the first and third term are negligible. This also holds if we replace b ′ by b * in these terms. The resulting formula, where all b ′ 's are replaced by b * 's, is precisely the advantage Adv AKDM (A) against the AKDM security of SE * .
Hence
is not negligible. Thus Adv KDM (A SE,1,p ) is also not negligible.
• 
As one of these cases must be true, one of our three adversaries succeeds with not negligible probability. This is the desired contraction and finishes the proof.
A DKDM-secure Scheme
In the following, we construct a DKDM-secure scheme directly from a random oracle H. For the time being, we do not lose anything by this need as all currently known KDM-secure schemes are also in the random oracle model. We only need a very weak version of the random oracle idealization: The oracle must output independent random values for different inputs. We do not need reprogramming of the oracle or similar features that are immediately problematic when the random oracle is replaced by real hash functions.
The construction extends that of the KDM-secure scheme in [31] . We immediately assume that the random oracle can take inputs of different lengths.
Definition 3.4 (DKDM-RO Construction) Let a random oracle H be given. We then construct a symmetric encryption scheme SE = (gen SE , E, D), called DKDM-RO scheme, as follows:
• To decrypt a ciphertext c with key (sk e , sk f ), decompose c into (r, c ′ , t). If this fails or H(sk f , r, c ′ ) = t, output ↓, else output c ′ ⊕ H(sk e , r). ✸ Theorem 3.2 (Security of the DKDM-RO Scheme) In the random-oracle model, the DKDM-RO scheme from Definition 3.4 is DKDM-secure. ✷ Proof. Let H be the random oracle, and at every time let its domain Dom(H) be the set of queries it already answered. In the interaction of a polynomial-time adversary A and the DKDM oracle SymDKDM, let E 1 be the event that an encryption query (enc, j, g) happens such that the first random oracle call in it is for an old value, i.e., already (sk e j , r) ∈ Dom(H). Clearly E 1 only happens with exponentially small probability within the polynomially many queries that A can make, because the second input part r is chosen randomly by the oracle SymDKDM immediately before each query.
If E 1 does not occur, we want to show that SymDKDM is perfectly indistinguishable from an oracle SymDKDM 1 that chooses each value c ′′ in an encryption randomly and independently instead of by a random oracle call, and thus also from an oracle SymDKDM 2 that chooses c ′ randomly for both values of b (because c ′′ serves as a one-time pad for m or 0 |m| for b = 0 and b = 1, respectively). This could only go wrong if sk e j became known to A, so that A could verify whether c ′′ = H(sk e j , r). However, by induction over the steps in the run we can show that A never obtains any information about a key (sk e j , sk f j ) that is or has been used in an en-or decryption, and that the values c ′′ are random, because there are only two ways how information about such a key could leak: One is in a reveal query, but the use of the sets Rev and Enc ensures that SymDKDM does not answer these for keys used in en-or decryption. The other is within a message m in the real oracle; however, by the induction hypothesis we know that this has not happened so far, and by the absence of E 1 it does not happen now.
Now let E 2 be the event that the adversary manages to make a decryption query (dec, j, c) where c is a new ciphertext with a correct tag, i.e., we have (j, c) ∈ C in SymDKDM 2 , but nevertheless c is a triple (r, c ′ , t) with H(sk f j , r, c ′ ) = t. The condition (j, c) ∈ C implies that SymDKDM 2 has not called the random oracle for (sk f j , r, c ′ ) in an encryption query (enc, j, m) for any m (because this format only fits the second call there, and then SymDKDM 2 would also have obtained the ciphertext c and stored (j, c) in C). Furthermore, the probability is exponentially small that it made this call in an encryption query for a value j ′ = j because that would imply sk
Even for the non-polynomial DKDM oracle with its infinitely many keys, this only happens with exponentially small probability for two values j, j ′ that A chooses in its polynomially many queries. If SymDKDM 2 had made this query in a prior decryption call, E 2 would already have been violated earlier.
Hence A has not obtained information about the correct t from SymDKDM 2 . Thus it can guess t only with exponentially small probability unless it makes a random oracle call for (sk f j , r, c ′ ) itself. However, A can only guess this input with exponentially small probability because SymDKDM 2 does not leak any information about sk f j . Hence E 2 only has exponentially small probability. If E 2 does not happen, SymDKDM 2 is perfectly indistinguishable from an oracle SymDKDM 3 that always returns ↓ for encryption queries (dec, j, c) with (j, c) ∈ C, independent of b. The reaction on such encryption queries was the only other difference between the real and fake oracle, i.e., between b = 0 and b = 1. Hence A has the DKDM advantage 0 when interacting with SymDKDM 3 , and thus at most an exponentially small one when interacting with the original oracle SymDKDM.
Sound Symbolic Symmetric Encryption in the Sense of BR-SIM/UC
In this section, we show that DKDM security is the right notion to prove the soundness of a Dolev-Yao model (in other words a formal or symbolic model) of symmetric encryption permitting key cycles in the sense of blackbox reactive simulatability/UC, short BRSIM/UC. We prove soundness for a symbolic model whose terms may contain not only symmetric encryption operators, but also asymmetric encryption, signatures, and message authentication codes, as well as lists (pairing), nonces, and payload messages. We prove BRSIM/UC for the symbolic system as the ideal functionality and the cryptographic realization as the real functionality. By the composition theorems of BRSIM/UC, this implies BRSIM/UC also for all protocols that are designed with the symbolic version and then used with the real version. By the property preservation theorems of BRSIM/UC, this implies that typical security properties are retained between the symbolic and the real version, in particular for integrity, fairness, liveness, and non-interference [9, 19, 13, 12, 16, 4] . Moreover, recent work has shown that computational soundness in the sense of BRSIM/UC entails stronger guarantees than relying on mappings between ideal and real traces, which underlies most computational soundness results that do not strive for BRSIM/UC [8] .
As we do not want to make a soundness proof from scratch, but build upon an existing one with the same primitives, only without key cycles, we build upon [15] , the extension of the soundness result from [20] by symmetric encryption. This line of work is so far the only one proving BRSIM/UC for the symbolic model as such, and the only one with such a large set of primitives. Moreover, tailored tool support for this library was recently added [53, 10] , and it turned out to be useful to conduct computational soundness proofs for a variety of cryptographic protocols [14, 5, 7, 17, 11, 6] . It turns out that we do not have to change the ideal and real functionality from [15] at all, as the absence of key cycles is modeled by a condition on the users of these functionalities there (typically protocols). Thus we omit this constraint and show that implementing the real system with a polynomial-oracle DKDM-secure encryption scheme gives the desired soundness result. We start by reviewing the notion of BRSIM/UC and by outlining the ideal functionality and the realization from [15] . Readers familiar with these topics can immediately proceed with Section 4.4.
Dolev-Yao Models in the BRSIM/UC Setting
BRSIM/UC is used for comparing an ideal and a real system with respect to security. We use this joint name for the closely related models of which different pieces were first introduced in [49, 50, 34] , building upon secure (one-step) multi-party computation [40, 41, 27, 47, 33] . Reactive simulatability between the real and ideal system essentially means that for all attacks on the real system there exists an equivalent attack on the ideal system. More precisely, blackbox simulatability states that there exists a simulator Sim that can use an arbitrary real adversary as a blackbox, such that arbitrary honest users H cannot distinguish whether they interact with the real system and the real adversary A, or with the ideal system and the simulator with its blackbox. We always assume that all parties are polynomial-time. The ideal system is often called TH for "trusted host", and the protocol machines of the real system are often called M u , where u is a user index. In our specific case of symbolic cryptography, the trusted host encapsulates the Dolev-Yao model while the real system is the distributed system that uses actual cryptographic algorithms and exchanges actual bitstrings.
Establishing a BRSIM/UC relation between a Dolev-Yao model and its realization requires some common syntax how higher protocols interact with the ideal Dolev-Yao functionality and the realization; in the underlying model from [15] this is done by letting the protocols operate on terms or real bitstrings, respectively, via local names called handles. Like all Dolev-Yao-style models when actually used for protocol modeling, e.g., using a special-purpose calculus or embedded in CSP or pi-calculus, the model in [15] , called the BPW model henceforth after the authors of this paper, has state. An important use of state is to model which participants already know which terms. Here this is given by the handles, i.e., the adversary's knowledge set is the set of terms to which the adversary has a handle. Another use of state is to remember different versions of terms of the same structure for probabilistic operations such as nonce or key generation. In [20] , as probably first in [46] , the probabilism is abstracted from by counting, i.e., by assigning successive natural numbers to terms, here globally over all types. This index of a term allows us (not the participants) to refer to terms unambiguously.
The users can operate on terms in the expected ways, e.g., ask the system to en-or decrypt a term or to generate an additional key. Further, they can input that a term should be sent to another user. In the symbolic representation this only changes the knowledge sets, i.e., in this specific Dolev-Yao model the intended recipient and/or the adversary (depending on the security of the chosen channel) obtains a handle to the term.
State Representation of the BPW Model
The BPW model of [15] , i.e., the ideal functionality of symbolic cryptography, is called Sys
(The parameters n and L are of no relevance here; n is the number of participants, L a set of functions enabling one to abstractly compute the leaking length of a term.) Its state is represented as a database D of the existing terms. Each term is characterized by its type (top-level operator) type, the list arg of its top-level arguments, the handles hnd u for different participants u, the index ind mentioned before, and a length len (needed because encryption cannot completely hide the length of messages). The non-atomic direct subterms of a term (i.e., excluding the term itself) are represented by their indices in the list arg.
As we build on [15] we repeat some of their notation: A database D is a set of functions, called entries, each over a finite domain called attributes. For an entry x ∈ D, the value at an attribute att is written x.att . For a predicate pred over the attributes, D[pred ] is the subset of entries that fulfill pred . If |D[pred ]| = 1, the same notation is used for its one element. An underlying list operation is written l := (x 1 , . . . , x j ) , where the arguments are unambiguously retrievable as
The indices ind come from a set IN DS isomorphic to N, and terms are successively numbered with it in the order of their creation. Index variables sometimes have a superscript "ind" for distinction. One writes D[i] for the i-th term, i.e., short for D[ind = i]. We often say "term i" below for this. The types range over a set typeset with skse, symenc ∈ typeset denoting symmetric encryption keys and symmetric encryptions, respectively. Each handle hnd u comes from a set HN DS, also isomorphic to N. If it has the "undefined" value ↓, participant u does not know this term (yet). Particularly important is the adversary handle hnd a (especially whether it is ↓ or not). Otherwise, u ranges over a set H of indices of honest users. Handle variables always get a superscript "hnd".
The Realization of the BPW Model
The realization of the BPW model is called Sys cry sym,real n,S,E,SA,SE,L ′ . (Here n is the number of participants, S, E, SA and SE are underlying secure signature, asymmetric encryption, symmetric message authentication and symmetric encryption schemes and L ′ is a tuple of functions determining lengths and runtime bounds.) Here each user u has a separate machine M u which contains a database D u where real bitstrings word are stored under the handles hnd u for this user, as well as for convenience the type type. The users can use exactly the same commands as to the BPW model, e.g., en-or decrypt a message etc. These commands now trigger real cryptographic operations. The operations essentially use cryptographically secure primitives -a DKDM-secure symmetric encryption scheme as the main scheme in our case -but with certain additional tagging, randomization etc. Send commands now trigger the actual sending of bitstrings between machines and/or to the adversary.
Soundness Definition with Key Cycles (DY-BRSIM Security)
Our security claim is that the realization of the BPW model with symmetric encryption is as secure as the BPW model with symmetric encryption in the sense of BRSIM/UC even if the surrounding protocol produces key cycles, as long as it avoids the commitment problem, which we already discussed before the DKDM definition. In the context of an BRSIM/UC soundness proof, it is even clearer that the commitment problem must be avoided because it immediately destroys simulatability. (One could resort to the random oracle model but here one needs a strong version where the simulator reprograms the oracle, so that the notion breaks down if the random oracle is implemented with a real hash function.)
In [15] the definitions of key-cycle freeness and avoidance of the commitment problem are joined, unfortunately under the name of commitment-freeness. Essentially we weaken this definition so that encryption cycles are no longer forbidden. We call the new property "pure commitment-freeness". The difference lies in a predicate wrapped where wrapped(j, i) denotes that term j occurs in term i only within encryptions that the adversary cannot decrypt. In [15] this predicate also contains a condition that such inner encryptions are consistent with a linear order on the keys and thus cycle-free. We replace it by a predicate pure wrapped that does not contain this second condition.
The actual definition needs some more notation, mostly from [15] : Given a state of the database D of the BPW model and an index i, the tree of sub-terms of term i, written tree(D[i]), is defined as follows:
arg. An input by user u to encrypt the term that u knows by handle l hnd with the key it knows by handle sk hnd is written in u ?.sym encrypt(sk hnd , l hnd ). The notation in u ?.send A(l hnd ) means that user u sends the term it knows by l hnd so that it will be received by the adversary. (The actual input in the original notation is send x (l hnd , v) with x ∈ {i, r} or v ∈ H.) The type enc means an asymmetric ciphertext. The wrapping of a term in another one is now defined as follows. . We then say that term j is wrapped in term i. ✸
The property Pure NoComm denoting the absence of the commitment problem is now defined as in [15] except for using pure wrapped. It states that if some user u encrypts a term l 1 at time t with a secret key sk unknown to the adversary, and a user v sends a term l 2 at a later time t ′ such that the adversary learns it and sk is contained in this term, then sk is wrapped in l 2 . whenever the other underlying cryptographic systems and L, L ′ fulfill the requirements from [15] . ✸ In reality, a protocol π using Sys cry sym,id n,L or Sys cry sym,real n,S,E,SA,SE,L ′ will usually determine whether the property Pure NoComm always holds. Thus one first has to analyze π for commitment-freeness, which should be in scope of automated tools. If yes, the BRSIM/UC soundness implies that a formal analysis of other properties of π carried out over the ideal Dolev-Yao functionality is also valid for π using the real functionality.
With these definitions, our soundness theorem can now be written as follows:
Theorem 4.1 (Poly DKDM → DY-BRSIM) Every polynomial-oracle DKDM-secure symmetric encryption scheme SE is also DY-BRSIM secure. ✷
We do not prove the necessity of DKDM security, but en-and decryptions as in AKDM and the additional key revelations as in DKDM security do occur in such a symbolic model. (We will see how they occur in our proof in Section 4.6, where we use a DKDM oracle within the overall systems.) At least for the goal of BRSIM/UC it seems hard to imagine how such a model could be simulated without allowing these capabilities in the underlying definition of encryption security.
Overview of the Simulator
For proving a soundness theorem without key cycles, a simulator Sim H has been defined in [15] such that the combination of arbitrary polynomial-time users H and adversary A cannot distinguish the combination of the real machines M u from the combination TH H and Sim H (for all sets H indicating the correct machines). We do not need to change this simulator at all, only the later proof of correct simulation. Basically Sim H translates real messages from the real adversary A into terms as TH H expects them and vice versa. In both directions, Sim H has to parse an incoming message completely because it can only construct the other version (abstract or real) bottom-up. This is done by recursive algorithms. The state of Sim H mainly consists of a database D a , similar to the databases D u , but storing the knowledge of the adversary. For understanding our soundness proof, it suffices to give a sketch of Sim H here; we refer the reader to [15] for the detailed definition.
Basically Sim H translates real messages from the real adversary A into handles as TH H expects them at its adversary input port in a ? and vice versa. In both directions, Sim H has to parse an incoming message completely because it can only construct the other version (abstract or real) bottom-up. This is done by recursive algorithms. The state of Sim H mainly consists of a database D a , similar to the databases D u , but storing the knowledge of the adversary. The behavior of Sim H is sketched as follows.
Inputs from TH H . Assume that Sim H receives an input (u, v, x, l hnd ) from TH H , meaning that user u sends a term/message l hnd to user v over a channel of type x (secure, authentic but not secret, or insecure). If a bitstring l for l hnd already exists in D a , i.e., this message is already known to the adversary, the simulator immediately outputs l at a port net u,v ,x !. Otherwise, it first constructs such a bitstring l with a recursive algorithm id2real. This algorithm decomposes the abstract term using the operations provided by the Dolev-Yao model. At the same time, id2real builds up a corresponding real bitstring using real cryptographic operations and enters all new message parts into D a to recognize them when they are reused, both by TH H and by A.
We sketch how the simulator specifically deals with symmetric encryption. If the entry corresponding to l hnd is a symmetric encryption key, id2real creates a new secret key and uses this key whenever an abstract encryption has to be simulated under the abstract key entry l hnd . If the entry corresponding to l hnd is a symmetric encryption, Sim H first determines the corresponding secret key by means of the public key identifier of the encryption. After that, it checks whether the adversary already has a handle to this secret key. If this is the case, the Dolev-Yao model allows for retrieving the plaintext of the encrypted message, so id2real only has to encrypt this plaintext with the determined secret key and output this encryption. Otherwise, the Dolev-Yao model only allows for retrieving the length of the encrypted message. In this case, id2real encrypts a fixed message of equal length.
Inputs from A. Now assume that Sim H receives a bitstring l from A at a port net u,v ,x ?. If l is not a valid list, Sim H aborts the transition. Otherwise it translates l into a corresponding handle l hnd by an algorithm real2id, and outputs the abstract sending command adv send x (v, u, l hnd ) at port in a !. If a handle l hnd for l already exists in D a , then real2id reuses that. Otherwise it recursively parses a real bitstring using the functional parsing algorithm. At the same time, it builds up a corresponding abstract term in the database of TH H . This finally yields the handle l hnd . Furthermore, real2id enters all new subterms into D a . For building up the abstract term, real2id makes extensive use of the special capabilities of the adversary modeled in TH H . In the real system, the bitstring may, e.g., contain an encryption for which no key is known yet that yields a valid decryption. Therefore, the simulator has to be able to insert such an encryption with unknown key and unknown plaintext into the database of TH H . Similarly, the adversary might send a new encryption key which has to be added to existing symmetric encryption entries for which this key is valid. These and similar cases for symmetric encryption are covered by using the special adversary capabilities of the Dolev-Yao model.
Proof of Correct Simulation
In the overall proof in [15] a system C H , called initial combined system, is defined that essentially contains all aspects of both the BPW model and its realization. It extends the database D of TH H by an attribute word containing real bitstrings as in M H or Sim H . These real words are computed as in M H for entries generated by the honest users, and as in Sim H for entries resulting from network inputs, i.e., values coming from the adversary. Hence all symmetric encryptions produced by honest users contain a real plaintext message. A second system C * H , called final combined system, is equal to C H except for symmetric encryptions: For encryptions made by honest users and with keys of honest users and without adversary handle, a simulated message 0 len * of the same length is encrypted instead of a real plaintext message. To distinguish keys generated by honest users from keys generated by the adversary in C H and C * H , entries of type skse have an additional attribute owner ∈ {honest, adv}. The only part of the overall proof that concerns symmetric encryption and their potential key cycles is the indistinguishability of these two systems C H and C * H . All other proof parts remain exactly the same.
Reduction to DKDM Security of Symmetric Encryption. We now show that the combined systems C H and C * H are reactively indistinguishable, i.e., black-box simulatable without the need for an additional simulator. The core of this proof is to show how a DKDM oracle SymDKDM can be used to simulate either C H or C * H , depending on the bit b in SymDKDM. We call the rest of this simulation C ′ H , i.e., the combination of C ′ H and SymDKDM should yield C H or C * H depending on b. Clearly, C ′ H calls SymDKDM for encryption and decryption with symmetric encryption keys unknown to the adversary. However, the combined systems can also use such a key in operations not supported by SymDKDM, e.g., put the key into a list and send the list over a secure or insecure channel. For these operations we use lazy evaluation, i.e., we leave open as long as possible if the key will remain secret and thus be treated using a reference in a function g, or if it has to be revealed so that C ′ H can use it directly to perform operations without outer encryption. Thus C • In all other commands except sending, i.e., list construction, signatures etc., the potential new entry is instantiated as before if all its (direct) arguments are instantiated, otherwise it is left undefined. (Note that a decryption command in C H never computes a new attribute word , i.e., we need not consider it here.) -Leaves other than secret keys are instantiated, i.e., constants in the function.
-A leaf that is a secret key is instantiated by the RAM program π j ′ where j ′ is the attribute jnr of this secret key entry.
-Lists are translated in the canonical way.
-For a signature or a MAC, which are probabilistic operations, choose a random string r of sufficient length for the computation and construct the deterministic function that computes the signature or MAC with this randomness. This randomness must be stored with this entry and reused if this signature or MAC occurs again.
-For an asymmetric encryption, the combined systems always encrypt strings of zeros, i.e., an asymmetric encryption term is always fully instantiated.
Finally, when a message is received from the adversary A, the recursive procedure for converting terms into corresponding bitstrings (called id2real in [15] ), like Sim H , tries to decrypt received ciphertexts with all keys known to the adversary, i.e., keys with
The following lemma establishes the indistinguishability of the combined system with DKDM oracle and the initial and final combined systems, respectively, and it thus completes the proof of Theorem 4.1. .owner = honest, we have .hnd a = ↓. An adversary handle is later only assigned in the evaluation of a send command, and there in the procedure id2real that C ′ H executes like TH and Sim, at least as far as handles go. This procedure also follows the tree of the sent term, assigning adversary handles to all subterms outside encryptions, and within encryptions with keys that already have adversary handles.
We now proceed with the proof of Lemma 4.1. First, the last sentence of the construction contained a claim. This is always true by Lemma 4.2.
The main statement of the lemma looks quite clear for b = 0 because C ′ H essentially acts like C H . It only uses SymDKDM for some operations with symmetric encryption keys, and when it performs other operations on the same encryption keys itself, it uses the same actual bitstring D[sk ind ].word := sk j by Lemma 4.2.
We only have to show that SymDKDM performs operations with encryption keys like C H would. This is clear by construction except in cases where SymDKDM refuses an operation. These cases are an encryption when already j ∈ Rev, and a revelation if already j ∈ Enc. Thus we show that C ′ H does not make such requests.
A query of the form (enc, j, g) is only made in a send operation, and only if D[sk ind ].hnd a = ↓ for the (one) key with D[sk ind ].jno = j. Then j ∈ Rev by Lemma 4.2. A query (reveal, j) is also only made in a send operation. Assume that this happens at time t 2 , and for contradiction that j ∈ Enc at this time. Then a query (enc, j, ·) must have been made at a time t 1 < t 2 . .hnd a = ↓ also at time t 0 . This is the precondition for the property Pure NoComm. Thus the implication of this property must hold for our considered sending operation at time t 2 , i.e., the key must be wrapped in the term t that is actually sent, formally pure wrapped(sk ind , t ind ). We now show that this contradicts the precondition that a query (reveal, j) was made in this operation. By definition, pure wrapped(sk ind , t ind ) means that for every occurrence of .hnd a = ↓. Similarly, C * H only differs from C H in encrypting zero-strings if encryptions are made by honest users and with keys of honest users that have no adversary handle. This is the same condition. Furthermore, in both cases this replacement is applied immediately before the operation sym encrypt.
Relations Between the Definitions of Secure Symmetric Encryption
In this section we investigate the relations between our definitions, together with underlying definitions such as IND-CCA2 security and ciphertext integrity. We summarize these results in Figure 1 . Arrows with labels "Th.x" or "L.y" refer to theorems and lemmas in this paper; some other arrows carry citations. Dotted, striked-through arrows show that an implication does not hold. Arrows without a label are clear from the definitions. There are three arrows with a question mark; they all correspond to essentially the same open question whether AKDM security implies DKDM security without a restriction on the number of revealed keys. This question seems similar to the selective decommitment problem [39] , but not directly related to the cases with known answers. We believe that all relations between definitions without arrows can be derived from the existing arrows.
Relations Between AKDM Security and Simpler Definitions
We first show that AKDM security implies the conjunction of the typical simpler definitions, but not vice versa. Once we also showed integrity of ciphertexts, IND-CCA2 security follows because KDM security implies IND-CPA security, and with the same proof this holds for polynomial-oracle KDM security. Then IND-CPA security together integrity of ciphertexts implies IND-CCA2 security, see Figure 1 .
For proving integrity of ciphertexts, assume that an adversary A has a not negligible INT-CTXT advantage δ. We construct an adversary A AKDM against the AKDM oracle SymAKDM as follows, using A as a blackbox:
• It translates each encryption query (enc, m) from A into a query (enc, 1, g m ) to SymAKDM, where g m denotes the RAM program that maps everything to the constant m. For the resulting ciphertext c, it stores (m, c) in a set C and returns c to A.
• For each decryption query (dec, c) from A it first checks whether there exists a pair (m, c) ∈ C . If yes, it returns m to A. If not, it inputs (dec, 1, c) into SymAKDM. If the result is ↓, it returns that to A. Otherwise it outputs b * = 1 and aborts the simulation. Let E denote this event.
• If A finishes its attack and A AKDM has not aborted, then A AKDM outputs b * = 0.
Clearly A AKDM ∈ A p already for a polynomial p of degree 1. • D * (sk , c||0) := D(sk , c);
To show that SE * is not AKDM-secure, we define an adversary A AKDM that makes two queries to the ADKM oracle:
• It first inputs (enc, 1, π 1 ) and decomposes the resulting ciphertext c into c ′ ||0.
• It then inputs (dec, 1, c ′ ||1) and expects a message m.
As c ′ = E(sk , sk ) after the first query, the second query succeeds with the output m = sk when A AKDM interacts with the real AKDM oracle, while the fake AKDM oracle always outputs ↓ on decryption queries. Thus A AKDM can distinguish the two oracles.
KDM security follows directly from the KDM security of SE because appending 0 to ciphertexts does not change anything when only encryption queries can be made.
Finally we show integrity of ciphertexts based on the integrity of ciphertexts of SE. Assume we have a successful adversary A INT * against the oracle SymInt SE * . (Here we once need the fully indexed notation for the oracles.) We then construct an adversary A INT against the oracle SymInt SE as follows, using A INT * as a blackbox:
• It forwards an encryption query (enc, m) to SymInt. If the resulting ciphertext is c, it returns c||0 to A INT * and stores c.
• For a decryption query (dec, c ′ ||0), it forwards (dec, c ′ ) to SymInt and forwards the result m.
• For a decryption query (dec, c ′ ||1), it returns ↓.
This simulation is only incorrect if A INT * can produce a ciphertext c ′ ||1 for which SymInt SE * would not return ↓, i.e., where D(sk , c ′ ) = sk . This only happens with negligible probability.
As usual, for cryptographic properties P , Q a statement "P does not imply Q" is always interpreted as "If there exists a system S that fulfills P , then there also exists a system T that fulfills P ∧ ¬Q". In both these lemmas one could omit mentioning IND-CCA2, because KDM security implies IND-CPA security, and that together with integrity of ciphertexts implies IND-CCA2 as shown in [30] .
Relation of DKDM and AKDM Security
In this section, we consider the relation of AKDM security and DKDM security. We first introduce a variant of DKDM-security where only a bounded number ρ of keys are revealed, because we can prove closer relations with AKDM for it than for the original, stronger DKDM-security.
Definition 5.1 (LOG-DKDM Security) An adversary A on the DKDM oracle SymDKDM is called ρ-revealing for a function ρ if it lets at most ρ(k) keys be revealed in every run. Let A p,ρ be the class of p-oracle-bounded and ρ-revealing adversaries from A ∞ , where p and ρ are polynomials or ∞. We say that a symmetric encryption scheme SE is (p, ρ)-bounded DKDM-secure iff the DKDM advantage is negligible for every adversary A ∈ A p,ρ , and that it is LOG-DKDM-secure iff it is (p, ρ)-bounded DKDM-secure for all p, ρ where p ρ is polynomial. ✸ Without loss of generality we can restrict ourselves to classes A p,ρ with ρ ≤ p. The condition for LOG-DKDM is fulfilled if p ρ or p p−ρ is polynomially bounded. Two important examples of LOG-DKDM security are that polynomially many keys are generated but only a constant number of them are revealed, or that a linear fraction of the keys is revealed and p p is polynomial. (Thus p is essentially logarithmic if there is no extra restriction on ρ; this motivates the name "LOG-DKDM".)
Clearly, DKDM security implies AKDM security, and polynomial-oracle DKDM or LOG-DKDM security implies polynomial-oracle AKDM security. We now consider the opposite direction.
Theorem 5.2 A polynomial-oracle AKDM-secure symmetric encryption scheme SE is also LOG-DKDM-secure. ✷
Proof. Let SE = (gen SE , E, D) be a polynomial-oracle AKDM-secure symmetric encryption scheme. Assume that it is not LOG-DKDM-secure, i.e., there exist polynomials p, ρ and an adversary A ∈ A p,ρ such that p ρ is polynomial and A has a not negligible DKDM advantage against SE. We construct an adversary A AKDM against the AKDM oracle SymAKDM, using A as a blackbox. Initially, A AKDM randomly selects a subset S ⊆ {1, . . . , p(k)} of size at most ρ(k). Essentially, S is a guess at the set Rev of the keys that will be revealed throughout the run. A AKDM therefore generates keys sk * i for all i ∈ S itself. Furthermore, it maintains an initially empty set C of ciphertexts made and sets Rev and Enc of keys already revealed or used for encryption, respectively. Then it handles queries from A as follows:
• On input (enc, j, g): If j ∈ Rev , it returns ↓ to A. Else if j ∈ S (i.e., the key is assumed to be revealed later), it aborts. We call this event E 1 .
Otherwise it sets Enc := Enc ∪ {j} and modifies g to a function g * by replacing every reference to sk i in g with i ∈ S by its own actual key sk * i . It inputs (enc, j, g * ) into SymAKDM, obtains a ciphertext c, stores (j, c) in C and outputs c to A.
• On input (dec, j, c): If j ∈ Rev or (j, c) ∈ C , it returns ↓ to A. Else if j ∈ S , it aborts. We call this event E 2 . Otherwise it sets Enc := Enc ∪ {j}, inputs (dec, j, c) to SymDKDM, and forwards the resulting output m to A.
• On input (reveal, j): If j ∈ Enc, it returns ↓ to A. Else if j ∈ S , it returns sk * j and sets Rev := Rev ∪ {j}; otherwise it aborts. We call this abort event E 3 .
• If A outputs a bit b * , then A AKDM outputs this as its own bit.
We have A AKDM ∈ A p because it only gets polynomially many queries, and the functions g it obtains are of polynomial length and only address key indices up to p(k) by the precondition A ∈ A p,ρ .
Clearly, A AKDM together with SymAKDM with bit b = 0 (the real oracle) perfectly simulates SymDKDM with bit b = 0 until a potential event E 1 , E 2 , or E3, because for the indices i ∈ S it consistently uses its own keys sk * i and for i ∈ S it consistently uses the keys sk i in SymAKDM. This also holds for b = 1 because no encryptions and decryptions are made with the keys sk * i (where the fake oracle would deviate).
We now show that if S is a correct guess at the final value of the set Rev , short is correct, then no event E 1 , E 2 , or E 3 can occur: A query (enc, j, g) or (dec, j, g) with j ∈ Rev causes j to be put into Enc, and thus j ∈ Rev cannot become true later in the run. (Recall that always Rev ∩ Enc = ∅ and that the sets only grow.) Thus the condition j ∈ S of E 1 and E 2 cannot be true. A query (reveal, j) with j ∈ Enc causes j to be put into Rev . Thus the condition j ∈ S of E 3 cannot be true.
Hence if S is correct, the simulation is perfect until its end, and the output of A AKDM is correct iff that of A is correct.
Furthermore, the perfect simulation implies that the view of A is independent of S until a potential event E 1 , E 2 , or E 3 . Thus the probability that S is correct is The question whether AKDM security implies DKDM security without a restriction on the number of revealed keys remains open in this paper. This question bears a strong similarity to the selective decommitment problem [39] , but seems not directly related to the cases with known answers.
The Influence of the Polynomial-Oracle Restriction
We start by showing that the polynomial-oracle restriction on the adversary in the definitions really makes a difference. We first review the original definition of KDM security and augment it with a polynomial-oracle variant.
Definition 5.2 (KDM Security, with Polynomial-oracle) Given a symmetric encryption scheme SE = (gen SE , E, D), the key-dependent message oracle or KDM oracle SymKDM is defined as follows: It has a (virtual) infinite sequence of keys sk := (sk i ) i∈N , where each key, when first used, is initialized as
, and the following query type:
• On input (enc, j, g) with j ∈ N and g ∈ F ∞ , let m 0 := g( sk) and m 1 := 0 |m0| and output c ← E(sk j , m b ).
The KDM advantage of an adversary A that interacts with SymKDM and finally outputs a bit b * is defined as Adv KDM 
We say that SE is p-oracle-bounded KDM-secure iff the KDM advantage of every adversary A ∈ A p is negligible, and that it is polynomial-oracle KDM-secure iff it is p-oracle-bounded KDM-secure for every polynomial p. ✸ Clearly a KDM-secure encryption system is also polynomial-oracle KDM-secure, and similar for AKDM and DKDM, but we now show that even the strongest of our polynomial-oracle definitions is not sufficient for the weakest unrestricted one. Proof. Let SE = (gen SE , E, D) be a polynomial-oracle DKDM-secure symmetric encryption scheme. Without loss of generality, let key generation be the uniformly random choice from {0, 1} k . (Typically this will be true anyway; otherwise one can treat the original randomness in gen SE as the key.) Let f denote a one-way permutation with domains and ranges {0, 1}
k . Let SE * := (gen SE , E * , D) be the symmetric encryption scheme where E * (sk , m) = 0 if f (m) = sk , else E * (sk , m) = E(sk , m). We first show that SE * is not unrestricted KDM-secure. An adversary A * constructs the deterministic function g that breaks f by brute-force search for the pre-image of the key sk 1 among strings of length k and inputs (enc, 1, g) to the oracle SymKDM. For b = 0 (the real oracle) this always yields 0 by construction, whereas for b = 1 (the fake oracle) the result is E(sk 1 , 0 k ), which is not equal to 0 with overwhelming probability. Thus A * can easily distinguish real and fake oracle. We now show that SE * is polynomial-oracle DKDM-secure. Assume for contradiction that an adversary A ∈ A p has a not negligible DKDM advantage for a certain polynomial p. We then construct an adversary A f that breaks the underlying one-way permutation f using A as a blackbox. Initially A f gets an input sk * , which was randomly chosen from {0, 1} k . It selects b R ← {0, 1} and i R ← {1, . . . , p(k)} and sets sk i := sk * and sk j R ← {0, 1} k for all j ∈ {1, . . . , p(k)} \ {i}. Now A f simulates the oracle SymDKDM for bit b; this is clearly possible as it knows all the keys. For every encryption query (enc, i, g) from A, i.e., with the chosen key index, it additionally checks if f (g( sk)) = sk i . If yes, it outputs g( sk) as a pre-image of sk * and stops the simulation. Since A only makes polynomially many queries, and the time complexity of every function g that A f has to evaluate in encryption queries is at most p(k), the adversary A f runs in polynomial time.
Let E j denote the event that A in interaction with oracle SymDKDM p makes a query (enc, j, g) such that f (g( sk)) = sk j , and let E := E 1 ∪ . . . ∪ E p(k) . If the probability Pr[E] were negligible, then the same A would also have a not negligible DKDM advantage for the underlying system SE, contradicting the polynomial-oracle DKDM security of SE. Hence Pr[E i ] is not negligible.
Until a potential occurrence of E i , the adversary A f perfectly simulates SymDKDM. Thus the probability that event E i occurs in the simulation is the same value Pr[E i ] as in the original attack, and given the uniformly random choice of i, the probability of E i in the simulation is at least Pr[E]/p(k). This is still not negligible, and thus the desired contradiction to the security of the one-way permutation.
Longer Key Cycles
Finally, to address the question if the key cycle problem is only due to cycles of length one (the case treated by prior counterexamples), we define security if only longer key cycles are allowed. We first define a key-dependency graph.
Definition 5.3 (Key-dependency Graph) For a program g ∈ F ∞ and a key number i ∈ N, we define "i ∈ g" to mean that key sk i is addressed by the program g. Let O denote an encryption oracle, i.e., an oracle that accepts inputs of the form (enc, j, g). Then given a history of calls to O, we define a current key-dependency graph G. In the initial state, it has no edges. For each input (enc, j, g), an edge (j, i) is added for every i ∈ g. By G * we denote the transitive closure of graph G. ✸ Generally, G could be written with indices O and h for the machine and the history concerned, but this would seem notational overkill for the following simple definition.
Definition 5.4 (i-KDM Security) Let a symmetric encryption scheme SE be given. Let A i−cycles p ⊆ A p with p a polynomial or ∞ denote the class of adversaries that never produce key cycles of length less than i, i.e., in interaction with the KDM oracle the current key-dependency graph G never has cycles of length less than i. We say that SE is i-KDM-secure iff the KDM advantage of every adversary A ∈ A Decryption D * of a ciphertext (c, tag) or c simply decrypts c with D. Note that the system is stateful as it has to record which key was used for encryption already.
To break the i-KDM security of the new scheme, an adversary A asks for the encryption of sk j with sk j+1 mod i for all j ∈ {1, . . . , i}, i.e., it enters queries (enc, j + 1 mod i, π j ). This set of queries produces only one key cycle of length i; hence A is a permitted adversary. If A is interacting with the real KDM oracle SymKDM with b = 0, the resulting ciphertexts are of the form (c j , tag j ) with tag j = r j ⊕ r j+1 mod i , and thus the XOR of all these tags is 0. For the fake oracle, b = 1, the tags are tag j = 0 ⊕ r j+1 mod i = r j+1 mod i and thus the XOR of all of them is usually not 0. This allows A to distinguish the oracles.
The semantic security of the new scheme follows from the fact that the tag for each key is random and thus gives an adversary no new abilities to distinguish.
The next rather simple lemma shows that the definition type from [32] , which only allows direct encryption of keys, not arbitrary functions g as the KDM definition used here, is indeed weaker (here for the symmetric setting). This seems folklore knowledge but not proven.
Lemma 5.2
In the random oracle model, there exist symmetric encryption schemes that are not KDMsecure, but secure if the KDM oracle is restricted to functions g denoting exactly one key. ✷ Proof. Given a KDM-secure encryption system SE = (gen SE , E, D), we modify it to a system SE * by changing the encryption algorithm exactly if m = sk + 1; then E * outputs 0. An adversary A against the KDM oracle inputs a query (enc, 1, g) with g = π 1 + 1. Then the real oracle returns E * (sk 1 , sk 1 + 1) = 0. Thus A can easily distinguish it from the fake oracle.
An adversary A ′ restricted to queries of the form (enc, j, π i ), however, can only achieve this case with negligible probability. Thus the KDM security of SE carries over to SE * for these adversaries.
Conclusion
We extended the notion of key-dependent message (KDM) security to active attacks and to dynamic divulging of keys to the adversary, assuming the latter does not introduce a commitment problem; we call these AKDM and DKDM security. We also introduced a polynomial-oracle version of the definitions that is sufficient for the computational soundness result and is easier to fulfill in the standard model of cryptography, where currently no KDM-secure encryption scheme is known. We constructed efficient schemes secure under the new definitions: For AKDM security, the construction is generic, i.e., if a KDM-secure scheme in the standard model can be found, then we automatically get an AKDM-secure scheme in the standard model. For DKDM security, the construction relies directly on a random oracle.
We proved that DKDM security is sufficient for proving a symbolic abstraction of symmetric encryption secure in the strong sense of BRSIM/UC. The soundness of such abstractions was a major motivation for the introduction of KDM security in [31] . It was first shown in [3] , but only for passive attacks, which are not sufficient for most usages of symbolic models. We believe that DKDM security is also necessary for a BRSIM/UC result.
We explored the space of old and new definitions related to KDM security and proved or disproved equivalences between individual definitions and combinations of several definitions. In particular, we showed that AKDM security (and consequently DKDM security) is not a consequence of KDM security and standard definitions of security of symmetric encryption schemes under active attacks, IND-CCA2 and INT-CTXT, so that special constructions are indeed necessary. For stateful encryption schemes, we showed that the separation between KDM security and semantic security is not only possible by key cycles of length 1, but of any minimum length i.
The main new open question is whether AKDM security implies DKDM security, or whether DKDMsecure schemes can be constructed from KDM-secure ones in a way that does not involve a random oracle. We can show the former if we restrict the number of keys generated or revealed in DKDM security. The general problem seems very similar to the selective decommitment problem [39] , but not directly related to the cases with known answers.
For Dolev-Yao models with key cycles, the overall consequence is that we have put them on a computational basis with the DKDM definition and the soundness result; however, as currently only specially constructed encryption schemes are provably DKDM-secure, and only in the random oracle model, the soundness is not as good as related results for Dolev-Yao models without key cycles, and we recommend that the latter be used unless there is a specific need for key cycles. (The same holds for the passive case based on KDM security.) Although good cryptographic practice is to construct protocols without key cycles, formal methods are used precisely to analyze protocols automatically that may not follow any specific design principles. The DKDM definition allows us to prove soundness of Dolev-Yao models with key cycles, a security feature that has until now not been automatically analyzable.
